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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops an international oligopoly model where foreign and domestic 
firms simultaneously choose their pricing strategies under the assumption of non-zero 
conjectural variations. The model captures the links between domestic and foreign 
producers’ prices and establishes a relationship between the price of domestically-
produced goods and the exchange rate, which appears to be important for the 
determination of exchange rate pass-through. It is also found that the equilibrium 
pass-through elasticity can be less than, equal to or greater than one depending on 
exporting and domestic firms’ conjectural variations. The empirical implications of 
the model are tested with the Johansen multivariate cointegration technique using data 
for Japanese firms’ exports to the US market. The results indicate that US producer 
prices are indeed influenced by the prices of their Japanese competitors and that the 
pass-through elasticity is less than one. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of the unresponsiveness of traded good prices to exchange rate 
changes has been extensively analyzed in the literature. Most of the existing 
theoretical and empirical studies focus on the analysis of the micro-foundations of 
firms’ pricing and attribute this puzzling empirical phenomenon – referred to as 
incomplete exchange rate pass-through – to imperfectly competitive market structures 
and the existence of market power by firms that sell their products in international 
markets (e.g. Dornbusch, 1987; Feenstra et al., 1996).  
The majority of these studies examine pass-through in an international oligopoly 
setting (Feenstra et al., 1996; Bernhofen and Xu, 2000; Bodnar et al., 2002). In this 
context, the existence of domestic competitors is recognized but their interaction with 
foreign producers is not fully integrated in the models. Thus, the possible impact of 
the exchange rate on domestic producers’ pricing behavior and its implications for the 
exchange rate pass-through have not been adequately analyzed.   
The exchange rate pass-through estimates obtained from the above studies 
correspond to partial pass-through, namely to the impact of the exchange rate on the 
price setting of foreign firms, excluding the effect through domestic producers’ 
behavior. This approach cannot therefore provide an accurate estimate of total pass-
through, i.e. the one accounting for all channels of influence of the exchange rate (cf. 
Adolfson, 2001). Total and partial pass-through are identical only to the extent that 
the effect of the exchange rate on other variables, such as domestic producers’ prices, 
is unimportant.  
In fact, the impact of the exchange rate on domestic producers’ prices can be 
very important. Feinberg (1986, 1989) finds that the exchange rate affects domestic 
producers’ prices in the US and Germany and argues that international financial 
influences on domestic markets must be seriously taken into account. Feinberg (1989) 
attributes the responsiveness of domestic producers’ prices to the exchange rate to 
these producers’ reliance on imported inputs.  Subsequent studies (Allen, 1998; Olive, 
2004) allow for the interaction between producers of imported goods and domestic 
producers when analyzing the latter’s pricing strategy. These studies establish a direct 
relationship between domestic producers’ prices and the prices of imported goods,   6
which is taken into account in the estimation
1. This price interdependence originates 
from two factors. First, domestic and imported goods are considered as imperfect 
substitutes in demand. Thus, a change in the price of the imported good affects the 
demand for the domestically-produced good and this leads to a change in its price. 
Second, both domestic and foreign producers develop perceptions regarding each 
other’s response to their own price changes. Such interdependence has implications 
for exchange rate pass-through, which have not as yet been analyzed in the literature.  
Our paper attempts to fill this gap by developing a model
2, which examines the 
pricing behavior of foreign firms that produce a differentiated product and compete 
with domestic producers in the domestic market. Foreign and domestic firms 
simultaneously choose their pricing strategies and are assumed to have non-zero 
conjectural variations.  The two price relationships derived, which correspond to 
exporting and domestic firms’ reaction functions, indicate that the prices of these 
producers are interdependent and this simultaneity establishes an indirect link 
between domestic producers’ prices and the exchange rate. Thus, the interaction 
between foreign and domestic producers’ prices and the exchange rate appears to be a 
key element in the determination of the exchange rate pass-through elasticity, which 
can be not only less than one but also equal to or greater than one, depending on these 
producers’ conjectural variations. The paper therefore contributes to the literature by 
providing a richer pattern for exchange rate pass-through; models that assume zero 
conjectural variations typically come up with a pass-through elasticity, which is lower 
than one.  
To preview the results, we find evidence of a relationship between US producer 
prices and the price of imports from Japan. This establishes an indirect link between 
US producer prices and the dollar/yen exchange rate. However, even after allowing 
for this indirect influence, pass-through is still found to be incomplete, although it is 
higher than that reported in other studies e.g. Faruquee (2004). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a 
literature review. Section 3 describes the model that motivates our empirical analysis. 
                                                 
1 Feinberg (1986, 1989) argues that the effect of the exchange rate on domestic producers’ prices is 
influenced by the degree of import competition. He does not, however, derive an explicit relationship 
between the prices of domestically-produced and imported goods.   
2 The model is similar to the one that Allen (1998) uses as a benchmark for his estimations.  It is, 
however, extended to account for the influence of the exchange rate.   7
Section 4 provides a brief description of the econometric method and discusses the 
empirical results. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. Literature review 
The responsiveness of traded goods prices to exchange rate changes, namely the 
degree of exchange rate pass-through, has been extensively analyzed in the literature. 
Most empirical studies find that pass-through is incomplete, and this is not just a 
short-run phenomenon but one that persists over time. The evidence of incomplete 
pass-through has motivated a lot of theoretical research examining its determinants.  
This research attributes incomplete pass-through to deviations from perfectly 
competitive market structures and the existence of market power by foreign firms. 
More specifically, they focus on the interaction between profit maximizing firms 
exporting to a foreign market and their domestic competitors and obtain pass-through 
from the industry equilibrium, which is defined by the intersection of the supply 
relationships of foreign and domestic producers. In this context, pass-through is found 
to depend on the degree to which foreign producers exercise their market power in the 
importer’s market (measured by the ratio of their marginal cost, in the importer’s 
currency, to the price they face in this market) and by their market share – measured 
by the ratio of exporting firms to the total number of firms in the importer’s market 
(Dornbusch, 1987 and subsequently Venables, 1990 and Menon, 1995). Thus, the 
industry equilibrium price pass-through is always less than one since it depends on the 
relative number of foreign firms that are subject to exchange rate-induced cost 
changes.  
Another strand of the literature accounts for the interaction between profit 
maximizing foreign and domestic firms but concentrates on the analysis of the supply 
relationship of foreign firms only and therefore analyzes import price pass-through. It 
is found that import price pass-through can be complete if the mark-up and marginal 
cost of foreign firms are constant and unaffected by the exchange rate, while if either 
of those varies with the exchange rate, pass-through will be incomplete.  Specifically, 
the mark-up varies when the price elasticity of demand is not constant along the   8
demand curve
3 (Feenstra et al., 1996) and/or the market share varies with the 
exchange rate
4,5 (Bernhofen and Xu, 2000). As to the marginal cost, this will depend 
on the exchange rate to the extent that foreign exporters rely on imported inputs (cf. 
Menon, 1996) and if this cost is not constant with respect to output and the latter 
varies with the exchange rate (see, Yang, 1997 and Adolfson, 1999). 
As to the empirical studies, they document a different pricing behavior among 
different groups of exporters. Japanese and, in some cases, German firms adopt a 
pricing strategy of incomplete pass-through of exchange rate changes to the price of 
their goods sold in foreign markets (Marston, 1990; Athukorala and Menon, 1994; 
Feenstra et al., 1996; Kikuchi and Sumner, 1997; Tange, 1997; Yang, 1997; 
Klitgaard, 1999; and recently Bernhofen and Xu, 2000 and Gross and Schmitt, 2000). 
UK and US firms, on the other hand, pass-through a larger proportion of exchange 
rate changes to their prices.   
It should be mentioned, however, that most of these studies analyze exchange 
rate pass-through in an international oligopoly setting by focusing on the link between 
exporting firms’ pricing behavior and market power and assume that foreign exporters 
take the prices of their domestic rivals as given when they formulate their pricing 
strategies. However, recent advances in the literature of industrial organization point 
out that the relationship between firms’ market power and their pricing strategy may 
be more multidimensional than it may initially appear. In the Cournot model of 
oligopolistic competition – widely used in the exchange rate pass-through literature 
(e.g. Dornbusch, 1987 and Bernhofen and Xu, 2000) – firms with high market shares 
are thought to be able to charge higher prices. In reality, though, firms may find 
themselves unable to charge high prices, if their competitors are not expected to 
follow their price increases. High market share alone does not guarantee higher prices; 
firms’ pricing strategy will be conditioned by their anticipation of their rivals’ 
reaction to this strategy, namely, their conjectural variations. Market conduct, hence, 
matters for price determination.  
                                                 
3 This result is derived from a Bertrand differentiated products oligopoly, in which the price elasticity 
of demand is a component of the mark-up. 
4 In a Cournot framework a firm’s mark-up is dependent on this firm’s market share.  
5 This relationship is expected to hold in a Cournot oligopolistic framework, since a depreciation of the 
importer’s currency, by increasing the cost of foreign exporters, shifts their reaction functions inwards 
and thus reduces their market share (cf. Shy, 1996).    9
Conjectural variations are a basic element of duopoly theory. What firms 
conjecture, affects the way they react. Cournot recognized that firms’ choice of 
production levels depends on their expectation about their rivals’ reaction to their 
output changes. He assumed, however, that they consider their rivals’ output behavior 
as given when they determine their production levels. The analysis of non-zero 
conjectural variations and their relation to firms’ profitability and price-cost margins, 
has largely been confined to the closed economy framework, i.e. to the analysis of 
firms that produce solely for their home market (cf. Clarke and Davies, 1982 and 
Machin and Van Reenen, 1993). The studies published so far can be classified into 
two broad categories. The first involves studies that try to identify the way conjectural 
variations are formed.  Conjectures are formulated rationally when they are consistent 
with their competitors’ reaction functions (for a discussion see Boyer and Moreaux, 
1983 and Bresnahan, 1981); these are known as consistent conjectural variations. Also 
firms’ conjectures about their competitors’ reactions may depend on the latter’s ability 
to react, which is usually related to their capacity utilization and financial distress.  
Specifically, firms with spare capacity are assumed to be more flexible and able to 
react. On the other hand, firms in financial distress are expected to follow a less 
aggressive strategy than firms with healthy balance sheets. The results of Haskel and 
Scaramozzino (1997) confirm these arguments. The other category of studies try to 
empirically measure conjectural variations (e.g. Allen, 1998). 
As already mentioned, most of the oligopoly models that are applied to an open 
economy setting assume zero conjectural variations. However, there are some studies 
that adopt the assumption of a non-zero conduct parameter. Turnovsky (1986) 
analyses the determination of an optimal tariff under the assumption of consistent 
conjectural variations in the interaction between countries. Further, Allen (1998) 
assumes non-zero conjectures in his analysis of the interaction between US producers 
and producers of the imported goods. Finally, Bernhofen and Xu (2000) assume non-
zero conjectural variations when solving their theoretical model but the relationship 
between the pass-through elasticity derived and conjectural variations is not analyzed. 
Thus, since in real world situations firms never regard the strategies of their rivals as 
given, non-zero conjectural variations must be explicitly taken into account in the 
analysis of exchange rate pass-through. The ability of exporting firms to pass-through   10
exchange rate-induced cost changes to their prices depends on their expectations 
about the reaction of their domestic competitors to their price changes.  
It must also be noted that most of the above-mentioned empirical studies on 
pass-through, apart from assuming zero conjectural variations, focus on the reaction 
functions of foreign firms only, and even though they include variables that account 
for domestic firms’ price competition, they implicitly assume that the pricing behavior 
of domestic competitors is not influenced by the pricing strategy of exporting firms. 
The price of domestic competitors is assumed to influence import prices but the 
reverse is not true. However, this latter assumption may not be reasonable given that 
recent evidence indicates that the interrelationship between exporting and domestic 
firms’ prices is very important and that economies with greater exposure to 
international markets have domestic industry prices that are more responsive to 
international competition (Olive, 2004).  
Allen (1998) is one of the very few studies that explicitly accounts for the 
simultaneity between domestic and import prices
6. He estimates import and domestic 
price equations of various US manufacturing industries and finds a significant degree 
of interdependence among the pricing strategies of the two groups of producers; not 
only domestic prices exert a statistically significant impact on import prices, as 
already noted in the literature, but also the latter influence the former. Thus the 
estimation of the import price equation should account for the interrelationship 
between the pricing strategies of exporting and domestic firms through the adoption 
of an appropriate estimation technique (cf. Allen, 1998 and Olive, 2004). As Allen 
(1998) argues, studies that fail to account for the impact of import prices on domestic 
firms’ pricing behavior may obtain inaccurate estimates of pricing to market. 
Consequently, the exchange rate pass-through literature could be extended to account 
also for this channel of influence.  
Finally, most of the analysis of pass-through so far focuses on its relationship 
with exporting firms’ market power, by examining mainly the nature of their 
interaction with domestic competitors. However, firms’ market power also depends 
on the degree to which consumers regard their product to be differentiated from other 
firms’ products, i.e. on consumers’ utility function (e.g. Taylor, 2000).  Most of the 
                                                 
6Even though import price equations are estimated, the issue of exchange rate pass-through is not 
examined.    11
studies on pass-through consider preferences that are of the CES form (cf. Bodnar et 
al., 2002). These preferences, however, result in a pricing rule in which prices are just 
a mark-up over marginal cost, and thus competitors’ prices do not feature explicitly. 
This specific demand structure, therefore, fails to replicate the documented 
interrelationship between exporting and domestic firms’ prices mentioned above.  
Recently, the open economy macroeconomics literature models consumers’ 
preferences by adopting a translog demand structure. Bergin and Feenstra (2001), 
conclude that, while models that adopt the standard CES preferences cannot  replicate 
the observed real exchange persistence, those that assume a translog demand structure 
perform better in predicting real exchange rate persistence. Apart from that, and for 
the purpose of the analysis of import prices, translog preferences have some other 
useful properties. As Feenstra (2003) argues, translog preferences lead to the 
establishment of a direct link between the price of each product and the corresponding 
competitors’ price. Hence, given the evidence, translog preferences may provide a 
good approximation of the demand constraint exporters and domestic producers face. 
So far, Allen (1998) is the only study that assumes preferences of the translog form in 




In this section we develop an ologopolistic model, which examines the pricing 
behavior of foreign firms that produce a slightly differentiated product and compete 
with domestic firms in the importer’s market. The theoretical model is similar to that 
of Allen (1998) but it is extended to account for the influence of the exchange rate on 
foreign producers’ cost. It is assumed that firms in each country are identical (cf. 
Yang, 1997) and we can therefore consider a game between two firms – one foreign 
and one domestic. The firms are assumed to compete in price strategies
7 given their 
expectations about the reaction of their rivals – these expectations are captured by a 
                                                 
7 When firms produce differentiated products, price competition can be assumed. In this case price 
competition is profitable for firms since imperfect substitutability does not lead to marginal cost pricing 
as in the case of homogeneous products (cf. Hay and Morris, 1991 p.116). On the other hand, for 
homogeneous products it is reasonable to assume that firms compete in quantities (cf. Dornbusch, 1987 
and Bernhofen and Xu, 2000) since this behaviour results to less output and higher prices (see Hay and 
Morris, 1991, p. 66).   12
non-zero conjectural variation term
8. As to the structure of the game, we employ the 
simplest possible one-period game, i.e. we assume that foreign and domestic firms 
simultaneously choose their pricing strategies
9.  
The demand for the firms’ products is derived from a homothetic expenditure 
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where  X  is the minimum expenditure necessary to obtain a specific utility level at 
given prices, U  is the level of utility,  , ij p p the price of good i and  j , respectively. 
For our two-firm model,  2 n = . To ensure that the expenditure function will be 
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From the logarithmic differentiation of (1) with respect to the price of good i, 
we can obtain demand functions in budget share form, namely the share of total 
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where  i s  is the share of total expenditure on good i. 
It can easily be verified that equation (2) corresponds to the budget share of 
good  i. According to Shephard’s lemma the partial derivative of the expenditure 
function with respect to the price of good i gives the expenditure-minimizing demand 










                                                 
8 We therefore assume that firms do not take the price strategies of their competitors as given.  
9 A single-period (static) game can be adopted since dynamic elements in either demand or supply are 
not assumed (cf. Kandiyali, 1997). The impact of dynamic demand-side effects on pass-through has 
been analyzed by Gross and Schmitt (2000) and Froot and Klemperer (1989) who developed two-
period (dynamic) games that are beyond the scope of the present study.   13



















 and the right-hand side corresponds to 
the share of total expenditure on good i,  i s . The term  i α  in eq.  (2) represents the so-
called basic market share; it is the market share that each firm could attain if prices 
equalised and it depends on tastes, advertising, past market shares and switching costs 
(cf. Allen, 1998). 
Accordingly, firms maximise their profits – expressed in the currency of the 
importer – by choosing their prices subject to the constraint of the above demand 
structure.  
The profit function of the foreign firm is defined as follows: 
11 11 1 p qe c q Π= −  (5) 
where  1 p  corresponds to the price of the imported good,  1 q  to the foreign firm’s 
supply, e to the exchange rate defined as the home currency price of foreign currency 
and  1 c  to the foreign firm’s marginal cost, which is assumed to be constant. 
If eq. (5) is rewritten in terms of market share we obtain the following 












where  1 s  is the foreign firm’s market share and  X is total expenditure, as defined 
above. 
The first-order condition for profit maximization of the foreign firm is: 
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This condition can be written as follows: 
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 is the foreign firm’s conjectural 
variation, i.e. its expectation about the domestic firm’s reaction to its own  price 
change
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share with respect to the price of the domestic firm, we get the following expression: 
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 as the conjectural variation of the foreign firm, in elasticity 
form. It can also be proved that the following relations hold for the elasticity of the 














η =− . 
Therefore, the first-order condition can be written as: 
                                                 
10 As is usual in oligopoly models, conjectural variations are assumed to be constant (cf. Boyer and 
Moreaux, 1983, p. 97). 
11 For our two-firm model, eq. (2) can be written as:  11 1 11 1 2 2 ln ln sp p α γγ = ++. Thus, the 
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 (9) 
Eq. (9) shows that the price the foreign firm sets in the importer’s market is a mark-up 
over marginal cost. This mark-up, evidently, depends on the firm’s conjectural 
variations and on its market share.  
By taking logarithms of both sides of (9), the following log-linear expression for 














12 defined by equation (2) can be substituted into (10) and the 
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 (11) 
The distinctive characteristic of this reaction function is that it establishes an 
explicit relationship between foreign and domestic firm’s prices, which holds even in 
the case of zero conjectural variation, i.e.  0 1 = θ , and is due to the structure of the 
demand functions reflecting imperfect substitutability of the two products in 
consumption
13. The assumption of non-zero conjectural variation simply gives rise to 
a richer pattern of responses. This is in contrast to the findings of previous studies on 
pass-through, which derive reaction functions for the foreign firms that do not 
explicitly include their domestic competitors’ prices (cf. Bodnar et al., 2002; Yang, 
1997).  
                                                 
12 As noted earlier, for our two-firm model the demand constraint that the foreign firm faces is 
equivalent to  11 1 11 1 2 2 ln ln sp p α γγ =+ + .   16
The profit function of the domestic firm is defined as: 
22 2 2 2 p qc q Π= −  (12) 
where  2 p  corresponds to the price of the domestically-produced good,  2 q  to the 
firm’s supply and  2 c  to its marginal cost, which is assumed to be constant. The profit 
function of the domestic firm is similar to that of the foreign firm except for the 
presence of the exchange rate. 



















=  is the domestic firm’s market share and  X  is  total expenditure, as 
defined above. 
The first-order condition for profit maximization of the domestic firm yields:                                     
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 is the domestic firm’s conjectural variation. 
By following similar steps as in the case of the foreign firm, we get the domestic 





































 are the elasticities
14 of domestic 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Equation (2) shows that the budget share of each good depends not only on its own price but also on 
the price of the competing good.  
14 The derivations are similar to those described in fn. 11.    17










 is the conjectural variation of the domestic firm, in elasticity form.  
By taking logarithms of both sides of eq. (15) and imposing the demand 
constraint described by eq. (2), which for the domestic firm is equivalent to 
22 2 22 2 11 ln ln sp p α γγ =+ + , yields the following log-linear form for the domestic 
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 (16) 
Evidently, this reaction function depends on the foreign competitor’s price, an 
issue that has largely been ignored in the pass-through literature. Thus, since the price 
of the foreign firm depends on the exchange rate, the domestic firm’s price will also 
be linked to the exchange rate, although indirectly.  
The indirect channel of influence of the exchange rate, working through the 
domestic firm’s price raises an issue as regards the accurate estimation of the 
exchange rate pass-through. The exchange rate coefficient in the foreign firm’s 
reaction function, equation (11), captures only the partial exchange rate pass-through 
(cf. Adolfson, 2001); total pass-through, i.e. the total effect of the exchange rate 
working through all interactions in the system, can only be obtained if we allow for 
the indirect impact of the exchange rate on the domestic producer’s price. For this 
purpose, the system of equations (11) and (16) can be solved to yield reduced-form 
equilibrium price equations for the domestic and foreign firms’ prices.  
By substituting (16) into (11), we obtain the reduced-form equilibrium price 
equation for the foreign firm, in which the simultaneity between foreign and domestic 
prices, established in eqs. (11) and (16), has been accounted for. 
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where  () () 12 22 1 F θθ =− − −  and  ( )( ) 12 12 G θ θ =− − .    18
Also, by substituting (17) into (16), the following reduced-form equation for the 
domestic firm’s price as a function of the exchange rate is obtained: 
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where    () () 21 12 H θ θ =− −  and F is as defined above. 
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 (19) 
i.e. it is the exchange rate coefficient in the reduced-form price equation of the foreign 
firm, and can be seen to depend on the conjectural variations of both the domestic and 
foreign firm. This is an interesting result since pass-through is now found to depend 
not only on the market conditions the foreign firm faces, as earlier work had assumed, 
but also on the foreign and domestic firm’s market conduct.  
As to the size of the pass-through elasticity, eq.(19) shows that it can be less 
than, equal to or greater than one depending on the combination of the values of the 
parameters  1 θ  and  2 θ , i.e. on market structure
15. An interesting case emerges when 
firms have divergent conjectural variations, and in particular when the foreign firm 
has a zero conjectural variation and the domestic firm a positive one. This is the case 
where there is a dominant domestic firm that acts as a Stackelberg-type price leader 
and a foreign firm that acts as a follower in the market and thus takes the price of its 
domestic competitor as given. In such a case, as  2 θ  goes from  2 1 θ <  to  2 1 θ =  and 
2 1 θ > , the pass-through elasticity rises commensurately and for  2 1 θ >  it becomes 
greater than one. The three-dimensional graph (Figure 1), which plots total pass-
through as a function of both  1 θ  and  2 θ , and Table 1 confirm this argument. They 
show that, as  1 θ  approaches zero and  2 θ  approaches unity, the pass-through elasticity 
approaches unity. It further indicates that in the special case where 12 0 θ θ == , i.e. 
                                                 
15 As Allen (1998) argues models with non-zero conjectural variations can characterise a wide variety 
of market structures depending on the particular assumption about the values of  1 θ  and  2 θ .    19
each firm takes its competitor’s price as given, and the Nash solution to the strategic 
game is obtained, pass-through is incomplete.  
An interesting result from the above analysis is that, in the case of zero 
conjectural variations, pass-through will be incomplete. However, with non-zero 
conjectural variations, the pass-through elasticity can be less than, equal to or greater 
than one (Table 1).  This pattern emerges since foreign producers, when forming their 
pricing strategy, take into account not only demand conditions in the importer’s 
market but also the response of their competitors. 
Total pass-through elasticity can be obtained from the reduced-form equation 
(17) estimated as an equilibrium relationship. This is a novel approach, since other 
studies estimate pass-through from the foreign firm’s reaction function only, ignoring 
the simultaneous determination of foreign and domestic prices and thus, the indirect 
channel of influence of the exchange rate, discussed above.  
 
4. Empirical investigation 
This section provides empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
exchange rate and prices by drawing on the experience of Japanese firms exporting to 
the US market, using monthly data
16 for the period 1993 through 2004. The empirical 
analysis focuses on the interaction between foreign and domestic producers’ prices – 
as established in the model of the previous section – and its implications for exchange 
rate pass-through.   
Over the sample period, Japanese exports to the US market accounted on 
average for 13 percent of total US imports
17. Thus, it would not be unreasonable to 
assume that US producers’ price strategies are influenced by the prices of their 
Japanese competitors. Indeed, high import shares may strengthen the link between the 
prices of domestically-produced and imported goods (cf. Feinberg, 1986), since 
domestic producers are more likely to interact strategically with foreign producers that 
have a significant presence in the domestic market.  
                                                 
16 In order to account for seasonality, we include seasonal dummies.  
17 Market shares are calculated on the basis of data obtained from the OECD’s Monthly International 
Trade.   20
The main empirical implication of the theoretical model is that, in the presence 
of interdependence between foreign and domestic producers’ prices, total pass-
through cannot be obtained from the estimation of the foreign firms’ reaction 
function, alone; this would ignore the indirect impact of the exchange rate on 
domestic producers’ prices. The estimation of the foreign firms’ reduced-form price 
equation (17), in which the above simultaneity has been taken into account, is likely 
to yield  a more accurate estimate of total exchange rate pass-through. 
The econometric analysis involves two parts. We start by estimating the 
domestic firms’ reaction function given by equation (16). This will reveal any 
dependence of US producers’ pricing policies on their Japanese competitors’ prices
18 
and thus the existence of an indirect exchange rate effect. Once the interdependence 
between US and Japanese producers’ prices is established, we estimate, in a second 
step, the Japanese exporters’ reduced-form price equation (eq.  (17)) from which total 
exchange rate pass-through can be obtained.  
Each of the US producers’ reaction function and the Japanese firms’ reduced-
form price equation is tested as an equilibrium relationship with the Johansen 
multivariate cointegration technique (Johansen, 1988). This methodology is 
appropriate for establishing long-run relationships when the data used are non-
stationary and has the advantage of accounting for all possible endogeneities among 
the variables used in estimation. One important issue when testing for cointegration 
with this technique concerns the correct specification of the model’s deterministic 
components. As Zhou (2003) argues, failure to correctly specify these components 
and/or capture changes in the data’s trend behavior, may bias the results towards 
rejecting cointegration too often. In this case, the best modeling strategy would be to 
split the sample into different sub-samples – when there are indications of changes in 
the trend behavior of the data
19 – specify for each sub-sample the model’s 
deterministic components and then test for cointegration
20.  
                                                 
18 Allen (1998) follows the same approach in order to test whether domestic producers’ prices depend 
on their foreign competitors’ prices – i.e. he estimates the domestic producers’ reaction function and 
tests for the statistical significance of the coefficient on foreign producers’ prices. 
19 Changes in the trend behavior of the data – verified by simple inspection of the series – that happen 
to coincide with significant economic events can be considered as possible subsample endpoints.  
20 For each sub-sample the model’s trend components are specified on the basis of the so-called Pantula 
principle proposed by Johansen (1992), which constitutes a joint test of deterministic components and 
rank order (see Harris and Sollis, 2003).   21
Another issue relates to the model’s specification as regards the endogenous and 
weakly exogenous variables and to the correct determination of the number of 
cointegrating vectors. It has been proved that the tests for the cointegration rank tend 
to under-reject in small samples (cf. Pesaran et al., 2000; Greenslade et al., 2002) – 
the estimation is not efficient, since the number of parameters to be estimated in an 
unrestricted VAR model is large relative to the sample size. It is therefore argued that 
economic theory should be used at an earlier stage to identify which variables are 
weakly exogenous and then estimate a conditional VECM model of the following 
form (cf. Pesaran et al., 2000; Greenslade et al., 2002): 
01 1 1 1 ...... t t t k tk tk t t zx y y yD u −− − + − Δ =Γ Δ +ΓΔ + +Γ Δ +Π +Ψ +  (20)                               
where Δ is the first-difference operator,  t z  is the vector of  endogenous variables,  t x  
is the vector of weakly exogenous variables,  [] tt t yz x ′ = and  t D  the vector of 
deterministic and/or exogenous variables, such as seasonal dummies. The above 
specification contains information for both the short-run and the long-run 
relationships via the estimates of  i Γ and  Π respectively. The matrix Π can be 
expressed as  ΄ αβ = Π , where α  represents the matrix of the speed of adjustment 
parameters and β  the matrix of long-run coefficients. The rank of the Π matrix – the 
number of cointegrating vectors – in this conditional system can be at most equal to 
the number of endogenous variables. It should be mentioned, however, that the 
asymptotic distribution of the rank test statistic in the conditional model differs from 
that in the full model (for a discussion see Harris and Sollis, 2003). Pesaran et al., 
(2000) computed the rank test statistic allowing for exogenous  (1) I  regressors in the 
long-run model. Appropriate critical values for testing for cointegration are reported 
in Pesaran et al., (2000), Table 6. 
We start by focusing on the relationship between US producers’ prices and the 
price of their Japanese competitors, as described by eq. (16). The number of stationary 
long-run relationships is determined by the estimation of a VAR model in three 
variables, US producer prices, US unit labor cost used as a measure of US producers’ 
cost and US import prices of goods imported from Japan
21,22. In order to give 
                                                 
21All variables are expressed in logs.   22
reasonable power to the cointegration tests, we use economic theory to identify which 
variables can be considered as weakly exogenous and then determine the 
cointegration rank from the conditional VAR model  (Greenslade et al., 2002). It is 
usually assumed that unit labor costs are unaffected by exchange rate changes (Gross 
and Schmitt, 2000). We will therefore test for the weak exogeneity of US producers’ 
unit labor costs
23. As Table 2 indicates this variable can be treated as weakly 
exogenous. This leaves us with a VAR model in two endogenous variables and one 
weakly exogenous variable. As is evident from the trace test statistic reported in Table 
2, the hypothesis of the existence of one cointegrating vector among the variables of 
this model cannot be rejected
24,25,26.   It therefore appears that a long-run relationship 
exists between US producers’ prices, their costs and the prices of goods imported 
from Japan. In particular, the coefficient on import prices in the normalised vector is 
0.37 and significant at the 5 percent level, further confirming the interdependence 
between the US and Japanese producers’ prices (Table 2).  
This suggests that estimation of the exporters’ reaction function alone would not 
yield an accurate estimate of the pass-though. This can be done if we estimate the 
exporters’ reduced-form price equation, which takes into account the above 
simultaneity. The empirical analysis in this case involves the estimation of a VAR 
model in four variables, the two already mentioned in relation to the previous VAR 
(US import prices and unit labor cost), and also the dollar/yen exchange rate and 
Japanese unit labor cost, measuring Japanese producers’ cost
27.  Following similar 
steps as above, we initially test for the weak exogeneity of the Japanese and US 
                                                                                                                                            
22 ADF tests confirm that all variables used in estimation are  (1) I . These tests are not reported but are 
available upon request.  
23 Before testing we must decide about the cointegration rank of the system. We will base our tests on 
the assumption of one cointegrating vector among the variables used in estimation, as predicted by the 
theoretical model of the previous section (for a discussion see Greenslade et al., 2002).  
24 Our sample covers the period of the recent US dollar depreciation that started in 2002. Reasonable 
results could not be found for the full sample. We thus, test for cointegration in the period 1993-2002, 
taking into account the fact that this prolonged depreciation may have caused a structural shift in the 
trend characteristics of the data – the choice of the sample endpoint is also supported by the visual 
inspection of the data.  
25 A conditional model with five lags, a linear trend in the cointegrating vector and a constant in VAR 
is used as the basis for our estimations. Pretesting indicates that this is the correct specification.  
26 Misspecification tests indicate that the model performs well except for the presence of non-normal 
errors. However, this is not a serious problem, as Cheung and Lai (1993) have shown that the trace test 
statistic is robust in the presence of non-normal errors.  
27 All variables are again expressed in logs. Also ADF tests confirm that they are all  (1) I .   23
producers’ cost variables
28. As Table 3 indicates, the weak exogeneity restriction on 
Japanese producers’ cost is rejected
29 while that on US producers’ cost is accepted. 
Therefore we proceed with the estimation of a conditional VECM in three 
endogenous variables and one weakly exogenous variable
30,31. The trace test statistic 
presented in Table 3 confirms the existence of one cointegrating vector among the 
system’s variables. Total exchange rate pass-through can now be obtained from the 
exchange rate coefficient in the normalised vector. This coefficient is estimated at 
0.42, which is comparable to the estimate of 0.3 reported by Faruquee (2004) for the 
pass-through of changes in the US dollar effective exchange rate to the US import 
prices
32. These low estimates of the pass-through elasticity may reflect the fact that 
estimations in both studies do not account for the impact of the exchange rate on the 
relative non-price competitiveness of exporters and domestic firms. 
As a final step, in order to test for the robustness of our results we perform 
stability tests on the long-run relationships estimated above. Initially, the plotted 
values of the recursively estimated eigenvalues are investigated. If there are shifts or 
trends in the plotted values further testing is required
33. This testing involves the 
recursive estimation of the coefficients of the cointegrating vectors which are then 
plotted against their +/-2SE bands. If the bands of the recursively estimated 
coefficients are quite narrow and do not cross the horizontal axis at any point in time, 
stability is ensured. 
The graphs of the recursively estimated eigenvalues of both models –the one 
analyzing the US producers’ reaction function and the other focusing on the Japanese 
                                                 
28 When testing for the weak exogeneity restrictions we again assume the existence of one cointegrating 
vector among the variables of the system, as predicted by the theoretical model.  
29 This finding is consistent with the argument that exchange rate-induced changes in the cost of living 
may lead to wage and thus unit labour cost adjustment, if wage setters try to keep real wages constant.  
30 A model with eight lags and a constant in the VAR is used as the basis for our estimation. 
Specification tests indicate that this is the correct specification. Furthermore, cointegration was found 
for the full sample and there are no indications of changes in the trend behaviour of the data.   
31 Misspecification tests show that the estimated model performs well. It should be mentioned though 
that the null hypothesis that the errors are normally distributed is rejected at the 5 percent level of 
significance; however, it cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level. Jacobson et al. (2002) argue that 
these specification tests are asymptotic and may thus suffer from size distortions in small samples. 
Inference at the 1 percent significance level is therefore justified.  
32 Faruquee accounts for the interdependence between US and foreign producers’ prices in his 
estimations although he does not explicitly derive price equations that display this interdependence. 
33 It has been proved that a simple relationship exists between the eigenvalues, β - the cointegrating 
vector and a - the vector of adjustment coefficients. Thus, if the graphs of the recursively estimated   24
producers’ reduced-form price equation – are not smooth (see Figures 2 and 3). 
Specifically, in the former model there appears to be a shift in the plotted values of the 
recursively estimated eigenvalue in 2001; this may be related to the US inflationary 
conditions at the time
34. In the latter model the shift appears to have taken place in 
2002; this coincides with the beginning of the period of US dollar depreciation. The 
recursively estimated coefficients of the cointegrating vectors in both models further 
confirm these findings
35. Interestingly, the point of instability of the pass-through 
coefficient, obtained from the recursive estimation of the Japanese firms’ reduced-
form price equation, appears to coincide with that of the recursively estimated 
coefficient of US import prices in the US producers’ reaction function (Figures 4 and 
5), both being located in the period between 1999 and 2001. This finding lends 
support to the argument that total exchange rate pass-through is influenced by the 




In this paper we examined the importance of the interactions between domestic 
and foreign producers’ prices for the determination of import price pass-through, in 
the context of an international oligopoly model where firms simultaneously choose 
their pricing strategies under the assumption of non-zero conjectural variations. The 
model developed, by endogenizing domestic producers’ pricing behavior, establishes 
a relationship between the prices of domestically-produced goods and the exchange 
rate, which must be taken into account when investigating exchange rate pass-
through. The model implies a wider range of values for the pass-through elasticity 
depending on foreign and domestic firms’ conjectural variations. The assumption of 
non-zero conjectural variations is an essential condition for the pass-through elasticity 
to be greater than one.  
                                                                                                                                            
eigenvalues indicate instability, the stability properties of a and  β  should be investigated further (for 
a discussion see Hansen and Johansen, 1999; Johansen, 1995). 
34 In the period 1998-2000 US CPI inflation was on the rise after having bottomed during the previous 
years. This is likely to have had an impact on the US producers’ pricing strategies that are also 
influenced by the general macroeconomic environment. This increasing trend was reversed in 2001. 
35 For expositional brevity all graphs are not reported but are available upon request.    25
The empirical implications of the model have been tested using monthly data for 
the exports of Japanese firms to the US market over the last twelve years and 
Johansen’s multivariate cointegration technique. The results indicate the existence of 
a relationship between US producers’ prices and the prices of their Japanese 
competitors. Estimations accounting for this price interdependence still provide 
evidence of incomplete exchange rate pass-through. 
In conclusion, the analysis in this paper has shown that domestic producers are 
exposed to exchange rate fluctuations through their interaction with their foreign 
competitors. Future research could focus on investigating further the issue of the 
exchange rate influence on domestic markets and its implications for exchange rate 
pass-through.   26
Appendix. Data sources 
The US import price index for goods imported from Japan (2000=100) is  obtained 
from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The US dollar/Japanese yen nominal 
exchange rate is the period average and is taken from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. The US and Japanese unit labor cost indices (2000=100) 
are obtained from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. Since the US unit labor 
cost data is available on a quarterly basis, we converted the quarterly series into 
monthly by interpolation. The US producer price index (2000=100) is also obtained 
from the Main Economic Indicators of the OECD.    27
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Table 1. Total pass-through as a function of conjectural variations 
Conjectural variation parameters  Total pass-through  
12 0 θ θ ==   0.67 
12 0, 0.1 θ θ ==   0.68 
12 0, 0.5 θ θ ==   0.75 
12 0, 1 θ θ ==   1 
12 0, 1.1 θ θ ==   1.13 
12 0, 1.2 θ θ ==   1.33 
12 0.5, 0.5 θ θ ==   0.60 
   32
 
Table 2: Estimates of the US producers’ reaction function  
LR test for the weak exogeneity  restriction on US producers’ unit labour cost
1    
2 X (1) = 2.6127 (0.106)  
 
A. Number of cointegrating vectors
2 Trace  test 
0  35.77 
(30.77) 
1   13.71 
   (15.44) 
B. Coefficients on cointegrating vector variables
3,4 
2 p   1 
2 c   -0.530 
(0.186) 
1 p   -0.371 
(0.110) 
trend   -0.001 
(0.0002) 
    Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are p-values to accept the over-identifying restrictions.  
 2. Numbers in parentheses are critical values at the 5 percent significance level    
(Pesaran et al., 2000, Table 6). 
 3. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. 
 4.  2 p ,  2 c ,  1 p  correspond to US producers’ price and cost and US import  prices 
of  goods imported from Japan, respectively, as defined in the theoretical 
model.    33
 
Table 3: Estimates of the Japanese producers’ reduced-form price equation 
LR  test for the weak exogeneity restriction on Japanese producers’ unit labour cost
1 
2 X (1) = 5.931 (0.015)  
LR  test for the weak exogeneity  restriction on US producers ’ unit labour cost
1  
2 X (1) = 1.874 (0.171)  
A. Number of cointegrating vectors
2 Trace  test 
0  43.64 
(38.93) 
1     19.66 
   (23.32) 
2     1.161 
  (11.47) 
B. Coefficients on cointegrating vector variables
3,4 
1 p   1 
e  -0.419 
(0.06) 
1 c    -0.768 
  (0.120) 
2 c   -0.134 
(0.241) 
    Notes:  1.Numbers  in  parentheses  are p-values to accept the over-identifying 
restrictions.  
2. Numbers in parentheses are critical values at the 5 percent significance level   
(Pesaran et al., 2000, Table 6). 
3. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. 
4.  1 p ,  e,  1 c ,  2 c  correspond to US import prices of goods imported from 
Japan, the US dollar/Japanese yen exchange rate, the Japanese producers’ 
cost and US producers’ cost, respectively, as defined in the theoretical 
model.  
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Figure 1. Total pass-through as a function of conjectural variations 
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Figure 3. Recursively-estimated eigenvalue –Japanese producers’ reduced-form 
price equation   36










Figure 4. Recursively-estimated pass-through coefficient in the Japanese 
















Figure 5. Recursively-estimated US import price coefficient in the US producers’ 
reaction function   37
BANK OF GREECE WORKING PAPERS 
  
21. Kapopoulos, P. and S. Lazaretou, "Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter 
for Economic Growth? A Cross - Country Analysis", March 2005. 
 
22. Brissimis, S. N. and T. S. Kosma, "Market Power Innovative Activity and 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through", April 2005. 
 
23. Christodoulopoulos, T. N. and I. Grigoratou, "Measuring Liquidity in the Greek 
Government Securities Market", May 2005. 
 
24. Stoubos, G. and I. Tsikripis, "Regional Integration Challenges in South East 
Europe: Banking Sector Trends", June 2005.    
 
25. Athanasoglou, P. P., S. N. Brissimis and M. D. Delis, “Bank-Specific, Industry-
Specific and Macroeconomic Determinants of Bank Profitability”, June 2005.   
 
26. Stournaras, Y., “Aggregate Supply and Demand, the Real Exchange Rate and Oil 
Price Denomination”, July 2005. 
 
27. Angelopoulou, E., “The Comparative Performance of Q-Type and Dynamic 
Models of Firm Investment: Empirical Evidence from the UK”, September 2005. 
 
28. Hondroyiannis, G., P.A.V.B. Swamy, G. S. Tavlas and M. Ulan, “Some Further 
Evidence on Exchange-Rate Volatility and Exports”, October 2005.      
 
29. Papazoglou, C., “Real Exchange Rate Dynamics and Output Contraction under 
Transition”, November 2005. 
 
30. Christodoulakis, G. A. and E. M. Mamatzakis, “The European Union GDP 
Forecast Rationality under Asymmetric Preferences”, December 2005.  
 
31. Hall, S. G. and G. Hondroyiannis, “Measuring the Correlation of Shocks between 
the EU-15 and the New Member Countries”, January 2006. 
 
32. Christodoulakis, G. A. and S. E. Satchell, “Exact Elliptical Distributions for 
Models of Conditionally Random Financial Volatility”, January 2006. 
 
33. Gibson, H. D., N. T. Tsaveas and T. Vlassopoulos, “Capital Flows, Capital 
Account Liberalisation and the Mediterranean Countries”, February 2006. 
 
34. Tavlas, G. S. and P. A. V. B. Swamy, “The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and 
Inflation Expectations: Re-specification and Interpretation”, March 2006.  
 
35. Brissimis, S. N. and N. S. Magginas, “Monetary Policy Rules under 
Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations”, March 2006. 
 
36. Kalfaoglou, F. and A. Sarris, “Modeling the Components of Market Discipline”, 
April 2006. 
   38
37. Kapopoulos, P. and S. Lazaretou, “Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Greek Firms”, April 2006. 
 
38. Brissimis, S. N. and N. S. Magginas, “Inflation Forecasts and the New Keynesian 
Phillips Curve”, May 2006. 
 
39. Issing, O., “Europe’s Hard Fix: The Euro Area”, including comments by Mario I. 
Blejer and Leslie Lipschitz, May 2006. 
 
40. Arndt, S. W., “Regional Currency Arrangements in North America”, including 
comments by Steve Kamin and Pierre L. Siklos, May 2006. 
 
41. Genberg, H., “Exchange-Rate Arrangements and Financial Integration in East 
Asia: On a Collision Course?”, including comments by James A. Dorn and Eiji 
Ogawa, May 2006. 
 
42. Christl, J., “Regional Currency Arrangements: Insights from Europe”, including 
comments by Lars Jonung and the concluding remarks and main findings of the 
workshop by Eduard Hochreiter and George Tavlas, June 2006. 
 
43. Edwards, S., “Monetary Unions, External Shocks and Economic Performance: A 
Latin American Perspective”, including comments by Enrique Alberola, June 
2006. 
 
44. Cooper, R. N., “Proposal for a Common Currency Among Rich Democracies” 
and Bordo, M. and H. James, “One World Money, Then and Now”, including 
comments by Sergio L. Schmukler, June 2006. 
 
45. Williamson, J., “A Worldwide System of Reference Rates”, including comments 
by Marc Flandreau, August 2006. 
 
46. Brissimis, S. N., M. D. Delis and E. G. Tsionas, “Technical and Allocative 
Efficiency in European Banking”, September 2006. 
 
47. Athanasoglou, P. P., M. D. Delis and C. K. Staikouras, “Determinants of Bank 
Profitability in the South Eastern European Region”, September 2006. 
 
48. Petroulas, P., “The Effect of the Euro on Foreign Direct Investment”, October 
2006. 
 
49. Andreou, A. S. and G. A. Zombanakis, “Computational Intelligence in Exchange-
Rate Forecasting”, November 2006. 
 
50. Milionis, A. E., “An Alternative Definition of Market Efficiency and Some 
Comments on its Empirical Testing”, November 2006. 
 
 
 